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The British Expedition to Sikkim of 1888:
The Bhutanese Role
Matteo Miele
In 1888, a British expedition in the southern Himalayas represented the first direct con-
frontation between Tibet and a Western power. The expedition followed the encroach-
ment and occupation, by Tibetan troops, of a portion of Sikkim territory, a country led
by a Tibetan Buddhist monarchy that was however linked to Britain with the Treaty
of Tumlong. This paper analyses the role of the Bhutanese during the 1888 Expedi-
tion. Although the mediation put in place by Ugyen Wangchuck and his allies would
not succeed because of the Tibetan refusal, the attempt remains important to under-
stand the political and geopolitical space of Bhutan in the aftermath of the Battle of
Changlimithang of 1885 and in the decades preceding the ascent to the throne of Ugyen
Wangchuck.
[Bhutan; Tibet; Sikkim; British Raj; United Kingdom; Ugyen Wangchuck; Thirteenth
Dalai Lama]
In1 1907, Ugyen Wangchuck2 was crowned king of Bhutan, first Druk
Gyalpo.3 During the Younghusband Expedition of 1903–1904, the fu-
ture sovereign had played the delicate role of mediator between
 Kokoro Research Center, Kyoto University, 46 Yoshida-shimoadachicho Sakyo-ku,
Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan. E-mail: miele.matteo.74m@st.kyoto-u.ac.jp.
1 This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17F17306. The author is
a JSPS International Research Fellow (Kokoro Research Center – Kyoto University).
2 O rgyan dbang phyug. In this paper it was preferred to adopt a phonetic transcrip-
tion of Tibetan, Bhutanese and Sikkimese names. The names of the Bhutanese and
Sikkimese royal families are transcribed respectively as ‘Wangchuck’ (dbang phyug)
and ‘Namgyal’ (rnam rgyal), following the traditional transcriptions in the two Hi-
malayan countries. Scientific transliteration is provided in footnotes and is however
used for bibliographic references, according to the system defined by Prof. Turrell
V. Wylie (see T.V. WYLIE, A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription, in: Har-
vard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 22, 1959, pp. 261–267). In the scientific transliteration,
long vowels are indicated by a macron. It should be noted that the transcriptions of
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English and Tibetans4 and in 1905, he received the Order of the In-
dian Empire.5 His destiny had nevertheless been ratified about twenty
years earlier, when in 1885 the then young Trongsa6 Penlop7 had de-
feated – along with Paro8 Penlop andWangdi Phodrang9 Dzongpon10
– his main rivals, Thimphu11 and Punakha12 dzongpons, in the
Changlimithang battle.13 The State of Bhutan, in fact, was founded
at the beginning of the seventeenth century by a Tibetan lama of the
Drukpa14 school, the Zhabdrung,15 Ngawang Namgyel16 (1594–1651).
After his death, however, the country – formally a Buddhist ‘theo-
cracy’ based on the traditional Tibetan dual system of government –
became the scenario of a long period of conflicts between the various
local lords until precisely the victory of UgyenWangchuck in 1885 and
his consequent coronation in the 1907.17 Later, in 1910, Bhutan would
sign with the British the Treaty of Punakha with which the Kingdom
accepted the English guide in foreign policy, while maintaining its sec-
Tibetan, Bhutanese and Sikkimese names differ considerably in the British docu-
ments of the nineteenth century from the phonetic transcriptions commonly used
today, making the reference doubtful in some cases. The Wade-Giles phonetic tran-
scription system was adopted for the Chinese language.
3 ’Brug rgyal po.
4 DGE ’DUN RIN CHEN, Lho ’brug chos ’byung, Thimphu 1972, p. 375.
5 J. C. WHITE, Sikhim & Bhutan: Twenty-One Years on the North-East Frontier. 1887–1908,
London 1909, pp. 140–144.
6 Krong gsar.
7 Dpon slob, translatable as ‘lord-master’.
8 Spa ro, in Western Bhutan.
9 Dbang ’dus pho brang.
10 Rdzong dpon, translatable as ‘lord of the fortress (rdzong)’.
11 Thim phu.
12 Spu na kha.
13 Lcang gling mi thang gi dmag ’dzing. On this period see K. PHUNTSHO, The History of
Bhutan, Noida 2013, pp. 485–492; WHITE, pp. 131–134 and 281. On the birth of the
Bhutanese monarchy see M. ARIS, The Raven Crown: The Origins of Buddhist Monarchy
in Bhutan, Chicago 2005.
14 ’Brug pa.
15 Zhabs drung.
16 Ngag dbang rnam rgyal.
17 On the theocratic period of Bhutan see Y. IMAEDA, Histoire médiévale du Bhoutan:
établissement et évolution de la théocratie des ’Brug pa, Tokyo 2011. On the Bhutanese
Buddhism see, inter alia, S. KUMAGAI (ed.), Bhutanese Buddhism and Its Culture,
Kathmandu 2014.
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ular and uninterrupted independence.18 The treaty was signed almost
half a century after the Sinchula Treaty of 1865, which had marked the
end of the Anglo-Bhutanese war (known as the ‘Duar War’) fought
between 1864 and 1865.19 This paper will analyse the role of Bhutan
between the British and the Tibetans during the British Expedition to
Sikkim in 1888.
The Tibetan Occupation of Lingtu20 and the Three British Victories
On 7 February 1888, Viceroy of India Frederick Hamilton-Temple-
-Blackwood wrote to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Thupten Gyatsho,21
a letter concerning the trespassing of Tibetan troops in Sikkimese ter-
ritory: “I write this friendly letter to your Holiness regarding the presence
of Tibetan troops at Lingtu in the territory of the Raja of Sikkim in the hope
that relations of amity which have hitherto existed between the Government
of India and the Government of Tibet may remain undisturbed. It is doubtless
known to your Holiness that some time ago my Government, with the knowl-
edge and concurrence of the Government of Pekin, proposed to send a mission
to Lhassa with a view to placing on satisfactory footing the trade relations
between India and Tibet. [. . . ] Unfortunately the object of the mission was
misunderstood at Lhassa, and, in defence to the representations made to us
on this subject through the Government of Pekin, the project was abandoned.
The consideration thus shown to the wishes of the Tibetan Government ought
to have removed any suspicions regarding the perfect friendliness of our in-
tentions, and ought to have resulted at least in the re-establishment of the
status quo ante. I regret to say that this result has not yet become apparent.
A small body of Tibetan troops which had been sent forward into Sikkim terri-
tory for the purpose of stopping the mission on its way to the Tibetan frontier
still remains encamped on the road which, in virtue of our treaty of Sikkim, we
have the right to maintain and use, and I am informed that this force, instead
of preparing to withdraw to Tibetan territory, have lately strengthened the
position which they had taken up in defiance of our treaty rights. Being most
anxious that our amicable relations should not be unnecessarily disturbed,
18 East India (Tibet). Further papers relating to Tibet, cd. 5240, London 1910, Treaty with
Bhutan, signed 8th January 1910, No. 346, p. 214.
19 Full text of the Treaty of Sinchula in East India (Bootan). Further papers relating to
Bootan, House of Commons Papers, 13, Vol. LII, London 1866, pp. 94–95.
20 Lung thur.
21 Thub bstan rgya mtsho.
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I have hitherto refrained from taking measures for the expulsion of the in-
truders, and have confined myself to friendly requests that the troops should
retire, but this forbearance cannot be indefinitely prolonged, and I now write
to your Holiness to inform you that if the troops in question do not evacuate
their position and retire within Tibetan territory before the 15th of March, I
shall be constrained to make good by force our treaty rights in Sikkim. At the
same time I wish to assure your Holiness that if the employment of force for
the purpose above indicated should unfortunately become necessary, I have no
intention, unless further provoked, of sending troops into Tibet, or of forcing
on the Tibetan Government any trade convention which they do not wish to
accept. All I desire is to ensure the withdrawal of the Tibetan troops within
their own frontier, and to obtain a satisfactory guarantee that for the future
our treaty rights and legitimate influence in Sikkim shall be duly respected.
I trust your Holiness will perceive that in the attainment of this object is to
be found the only firm, durable basis for those long-established amicable rela-
tions between the Government of India and the Government of Tibet which it
is my earnest desire maintain and strengthen.”22
Today, Sikkim is a small state of India bordering the north and east
with Tibet, west with Nepal, south-east with the Kingdom of Bhutan
and south with the Indian state of West Bengal. Until the annexation
of 1975, the country was an independent kingdom, known in Tibetan
under the name of ’Bras ljongs, the ‘fruitful valley’. It was founded
in 1642 with the coronation of Phuntshok Namgyal,23 first Chogyal,24
in the same year in which the fifth Dalai Lama, thanks to the help of
the Mongols of Güši qan, subjected Tibet to the Geluk school.25 On
28th March 1861, the British and the Sikkimese signed the Treaty of
22 The National Archives, London, Kew (further only TNA), Foreign Office (further
only FO) 17/1108, The Viceroy of India to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, 7th February
1888, Enclosure of a letter to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, No. 24, f. 21.
23 Phun tshogs rnam rgyal.
24 Chos rgyal (‘Dharma king’). Between 1642 and 1975, twelve chogyals ascended the
throne of Sikkim. The first monarch was Phuntsok Namgyal (1604–1670), while
the last one was Palden Thondup Namgyal (Dpal ldan don grub rnam rgyal, 1923–
1982) who reigned until 1975, when Sikkim was annexed to India. CHOS DBANG
(Mkhan po), Sbas yul ’bras mo ljongs kyi chos srid dang ’brel ba’i rgyal rabs lo rgyus bden
don kun gsal me long, Gangtok 2003, pp. 112–392. On the history of early Sikkim
see S. MULLARD, Opening the Hidden Land: State Formation and the Construction of
Sikkimese History, Leiden, Boston 2011.
25 Dge lugs.
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Tumlong,26 at the end of the short Anglo-Sikkimese war.27 The doc-
ument provided, inter alia, that “[i]f any disputes or questions arise be-
tween the people of Sikkim and those of neighboring States, such disputes
or questions shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government,
and the Sikkim Government agrees to abide by the decision of the British
Government” (article 17). Furthermore “[t]he Government of Sikkim will
not cede or lease any portion of its territory to any other State, without the
permission of the British Government” (article 19) and “[t]he Government
of Sikkim engages that no armed force belonging to any other country shall
pass through Sikkim without the sanction of the British Government” (ar-
ticle 20). Article 13 guaranteed the British the possibility of building
“a road through Sikkim, with the view of encouraging trade”. The penulti-
mate article of the treaty finally established that “[w]ith a view to the
establishment of an efficient Government in Sikkim, and to the better mainte-
nance of friendly relations with the British Government, the Rajah of Sikkim
agrees to remove the seat of his Government from Thibet to Sikkim, and reside
there for nine months in the year. It is further agreed that a vakeel28 shall be
accredited by the Sikkim Government, who shall reside permanently at Dar-
jeeling”29 (article 22). In the years that followed, the road was therefore
built along a route that from Darjeeling reached the Jelap Pass, on the
border with Tibet,30 a few miles east of Gangtok.31 In 1886, three hun-
dred Tibetan soldiers crossed the frontier for about thirteen miles and
occupied Lingtu.32 In addition, the then Sikkimese Chogyal, Thutob
26 Full text of the treaty in Copy or extracts of despatches relating to the Sikkim expedition,
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XL, 1862, pp. 44–46.
27 On this, see A. MCKAY, “ADifficult Country, a Hostile Chief, and a still more Hostile
Minister”: the Anglo-Sikkim War of 1861, in: Bulletin of Tibetology, 45, 2, 2009 and 46,
1, 2010, pp. 31–48.
28 An ambassador or an agent. W. HAMILTON, The East-India Gazetter, Vol. II, London
1828, p. 733.
29 Sikkim ceded the Hill of Darjeeling to the British in 1835. See E. C. DOZEY, Concise
History of Darjeeling District since 1835, Calcutta 1922, p. 3.
30 S. C. BAYLEY, The Sikkim Expedition of 1888, in: Journal of the Royal Society of Arts,
58, 3005, June 24, 1910, pp. 734–736.
31 Sgang thog.
32 British Library, London (further only BL), IOR/L/MIL/17/12/60, Report on the
Sikhim Expedition: From January 1888 to January 1890, prepared (under the orders
of the Quarter Master General in India) by Lieutenant C. J. Markham, in the Intelli-
gence Branch, Calcutta 1890, pp. 1–2; Frontier and overseas expeditions from India, com-
piled in the Intelligence Branch Division of the Chief of the Staff Army Head Quarters, India,
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Namgyal,33 who had ascended the throne in 1874,34 continued to re-
side for several months in Tibet, in the Chumbi35 Valley, in violation
of Article XXII of the Treaty of Tumlong.36 Officially, the Chogyal had
gone to Tibet following the arrival in Phari37 of a Sino-Tibetan delega-
tion that was supposed to settle a crisis between Bhutan and Tibet.38
In a conciliatory response to the Tibetan encroachment, the British de-
cided to stop the preparations for the Macaulay Mission to Tibet39 – a
possibility provided by a “separate article” of the Chefoo Convention
of 187640 –, obtaining, however, the construction by the Tibetans of a
Vol. IV, North and North-Eastern Frontier Tribes, Simla 1907, p. 50.
33 Mthu stobs rnam rgyal.
34 CHOS DBANG (Mkhan po), p. 223.
35 Chu ’bi.
36 Frontier and overseas expeditions from India, p. 50.
37 Phag ri.
38 TNA, FO 17/1108, J. Ware Edgar to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department, 10th February 1888, No. 28, Enclosure No. 1, ff. 27–28, p. 2.
39 BL, IOR/L/MIL/17/12/60, Report on the Sikhim Expedition, p. 2; Frontier and over-
seas expeditions from India, p. 50. “Inasmuch as inquiry into the circumstances by the Chi-
nese Government has shown the existence of many obstacles to theMission to Thibet provided
for in the Separate Article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the
Mission forthwith. With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrange-
ments for frontier trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Govern-
ment, after careful inquiry into the circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage
the people with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it be practicable,
the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider Trade Regulations; but if in-
superable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter
unduly.” Article IV of the Convention between Great Britain and China, relative to
Burmah and Thibet. – Signed at Peking, July 24, 1886. Full text of the Convention in:
British and Foreign State Papers (further only BSP), Vol. 77, pp. 80–81. The expedition
had obtained the passports to Tibet from the Chinese authorities in November 1885.
TNA, FO 17/987, Mr. O’Conor to the Marquess of Salisbury, 14th November 1885,
f. 337.
40 “Her Majesty’s Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next
year by way of Peking through Kan-Su and Koko-Nor, or by way of Ssu-Ch’uen to Thibet,
and thence to India, the Tsung-li Yamên having due regard to the circumstances will, when
the time arrives, issue the necessary passports, and will address letters to the high provincial
authorities and the Resident in Thibet. If the Mission should not be sent by these routes,
but should be proceeding across the Indian frontier to Thibet, the Tsung-li Yamên, on receipt
of a communication to the above effect from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese
Resident in Thibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers
to take due care of the Mission; and passports for the Mission will be issued by the Tsung-li
Yamên, that its passage be not obstructed.” English text of the Agreement in: BSP, 71,
pp. 753–759.
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fortification on the road and blocking the trade route.41 In November
1887, the British sent Alfred Wallis Paul to Sikkim, together with John
Claude White, to convince the Chogyal to return to his kingdom and
leave the Chumbi Valley in Tibet.42 At the time, Paul was the Deputy
Commissioner in Darjeeling.43 In Sikkim, the British official met the
Phodong Lama44 – who ruled the small country, together with his
brother, during the absence of the Chogyal –, but not the king who
returned a few weeks later, around the end of the year, together with
some Tibetans.45 The British realized that the Sikkimese political elite
was substantially opposed to the closeness between the Chogyal and
Tibet, with a couple of exceptions among the laymen and probably
among the monks of Pemionchi.46 The need to stop the Tibetan oc-
cupation was necessary for the British, as well as for the matter itself
and the defence of Sikkim, also to avoid “bad effect both in Bhutan and
in Nepal”,47 the other two main Himalayan countries allied with Lon-
don. The occupation of Lingtu was, however, on the Tibetan side, also
a challenge to the Ch’ing authority, to the authority of Peking: in fact,
in Lhasa – according to information that the British obtained – the rift
in the guide of the question passed between a religious faction hostile
to China, and contrary to the withdrawal from Lingtu, and a faction
with a lay guide that “wish to obey China, to withdraw the force at Lingtu,
and to abstain from further interference in the affairs of Sikkim”.48 It should
be underlined that the occupation of Lingtu was taking place under
the reign of a young Dalai Lama, born in 1876,49 and in particular in
41 BL, IOR/L/MIL/17/12/60, Report on the Sikhim Expedition, p. 2; Frontier and over-
seas expeditions from India, p. 50.
42 WHITE, p. 19.
43 The India List: Civil and Military, July, 1888, London 1888, p. 67; The India List and India
Office List for 1905, London 1905, p. 584.
44 Pho gdong bla ma.
45 TNA, FO 17/1108, J. Ware Edgar to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department, 10th February 1888, No. 28, Enclosure No. 1, p. 27; TNA, FO 17/1108,
J. Ware Edgar to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
17th January 1888, No. 22, Enclosure No. 1, f. 17, p. 1.
46 TNA, FO 17/1108, J. Ware Edgar to the Secretary to the Government of India, For-
eign Department, 10th February 1888, No. 28, Enclosure No. 1, f. 27, p. 1. Pemionchi
monastery (Pemayangtse, pad ma yang rtse) is in South-Western Sikkim.
47 Ibidem.
48 Ibidem, f. 28, p. 4.
49 THUB BSTAN BYAMS PA TSHUL KHRIMS BSTAN ’DZIN, Rgyal dbang sku phreng
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the passage of power between regent Ngawang Pelden Chokyi Gyelt-
shen,50 who had passed away in the spring of 1886,51 and the new
regent, Ngawang Lobzang Thrinle Rabgye,52 appointed in the same
year.53
Alfred Wallis Paul managed to meet the Chogyal in mid-February
1888. On 20th March 1888,54 the British conquered the fort that had
been built in Lingtu,55 forcing the Tibetans to flee over the Jelap Pass
and into the Chumbi Valley, where they expected substantial rein-
forcements.56 Thomas Graham was the head of the British forces in
Sikkim.57 Alfred Wallis Paul was the Political Officer of the Sikkim
Field Force.58 Two months later, on 22 May 1888, a Tibetan attack was
launched against the British in Gnatong and it also ended with a Brit-
ish victory.59 A fewweeks earlier, the British had obtained information
bcu gsum pa thub bstan rgya mtsho’i rnam thar, Vol. 1, Pe cin n.d., p. 50.
50 Ngag dbang dpal ldan chos kyi rgyal mtshan.
51 BLO BZANGYE SHES BSTAN PA’I RGYALMTSHAN, Rta tshag rje drung ngag dbang
dpal ldan chos kyi rgyal mtshan gyi rnam thar, s.l. n.d., ff. 54b–55a.
52 Ngag dbang blo bzang ’phrin las rab rgyas.
53 L. PETECH, The Dalai-Lamas and Regents of Tibet: A Chronological Study, in:
T’oung Pao, 47, 1959, p. 393.
54 TNA, FO 17/1108, A.W. Paul to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal,
Political Department, 25th February 1888, enclosed to J. Ware Edgar to the Secretary
to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 10th April 1888, No. 128, Enclosure
No. 1, f. 119, p. 1.
55 East India (progress and condition). Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress
and condition of India during the year 1888–89. Twenty-fifth number, House of Com-
mons Parliamentary Papers, 384, Vol. LIII, 1890, p. 204; TNA, FO 17/1108, Sir J. Wal-
sham to Marquis of Salisbury, 24th March 1888, Telegram No. 13, f. 63. Paul indi-
cates 21st March as the day of the conquest of Lingtu, but he writes: “next day,
the 21st, Lingtu was taken without opposition”, referring with “next day” to the battle
of 19th March: an error is therefore possible. Ibidem, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar,
2nd May 1888, enclosed to J. Ware Edgar to H.M. Durand, 8th May 1888, No. 128,
Enclosure No. 2, f. 121, p. 6.
56 East India (progress and condition). Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress
and condition of India during the year 1888–89. Twenty-fifth number, House of Commons
Parliamentary Papers, 384, Vol. LIII, 1890, p. 204.
57 TNA, FO 17/1108, Sir J. Walsham to Foreign (copy to India Office), No. 60, f. 67.
58 Ibidem, f. 185.
59 Ibidem, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 25th May 1888, attached to J. Ware Edgar to
H.M. Durand, 29th May 1888, No. 128, Enclosure No. 3, ff. 122–123, pp. 8–9; East
India (progress and condition). Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress and
condition of India during the year 1888–89. Twenty-fifth number, House of Commons
Parliamentary Papers, 384, Vol. LIII, 1890, p. 204.
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about the imminence of a Tibetan attack by the Nepalese prime minis-
ter.60 However, the Viceroy of India prevented Graham from overcom-
ing the Jelap pass.61 In September, finally, the hostilities ceased with
the final expulsion of the Tibetans beyond the Tuko-la pass62 and the
entry of the British troops into Tibetan territory, in the Chumbi Valley
on 26th September 1888.63
The British Expedition and the Bhutanese
The British had received from both the Kingdom of Nepal and the
State of Bhutan the proposal to act as mediators in the Anglo-Tibetan
crisis.64 In April, AlfredWallis Paul received a letter from the Deb Raja
“asking to be allowed to mediate between Tibet and ourselves”.65 The then
Deb Raja – as the English called the Druk Desi,66 i. e. the secular head
of Bhutan – was Sangay Dorji,67 appointed by Ugyen Wangchuck af-
ter the victory of Changlimithang.68 The Deb Raja proposed “to send a
Grand Lama and high officials” to Paul as mediators between the British
and the Tibetans.69 Paul proposed to his superiors to “reply thanking
him and saying we always wish to be at peace and are ready to listen to
Tibet, if she will send deputation to meet me, and that he may send his of-
ficials here”.70 Furthermore, the letter of the Deb Raja “appeals to our
treaty with Bhutan as making us and Bhutan one”.71 Despite the lack of
60 TNA, FO 17/1108, From Viceroy (to India Office), 2nd May 1888, f. 76A.
61 Ibidem. From Viceroy (to India Office), 28th May 1888, f. 84.
62 East India (progress and condition). Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress
and condition of India during the year 1888–89. Twenty-fifth number, House of Commons
Parliamentary Papers, 384, Vol. LIII, 1890, p. 204.
63 TNA, FO 17/1108, Telegram of the 26th September 1888, from Paul, repeated from the
Secretary, Bengal Government, Darjiling, to Foreign Secretary, Simla, 27th September
1888, No. 166, Enclosure No. 8, f. 291, p. 4; P. R. RAO, India and Sikkim: 1814–1970,
New Delhi, Jullundur 1972, pp. 94–95.
64 TNA, FO 17/1108, The Government of India, Foreign Department to Viscount Cross,
No. 128, f. 116, p. 1.
65 Ibidem, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 2nd May 1888, enclosed to J. Ware Edgar to H.M.
Durand, 8th May 1888, No. 128, Enclosure No. 2, f. 122, p. 7.
66 ’Brug sde srid.
67 Sangs rgyas rdo rje.
68 PHUNTSHO, p. 492.
69 TNA, FO 17/1108, Chief Secretary, Bengal, Calcutta to Foreign Department, Simla
(Telegram), 14th April 1888, No. 128, Enclosure No. 8, f. 125, p. 14.
70 Ibidem.
71 Ibidem.
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optimism with respect to some result, the Lieutenant-Governor,
Steuart Colvin Bayley, nevertheless proposed to endorse Paul’s re-
sponse to the Deb Raja.72
The Viceroy of India, Dufferin, however, while approving, did not
feel the need for a real negotiation with the Tibetans, defeated in the
first confrontation, and feared instead that the Bhutanese representa-
tives could hinder Paul’s action.73 The Bhutanese delegates had to re-
fer only to the will of the British to live in peace with the Tibetans,
but without any possibility to “permit any foreign power to interfere in
the affairs of Sikkim, which is a State dependent upon the British Govern-
ment”.74 In case of further encroachments in the Sikkimese territory by
the Tibetan troops, then “it will be necessary for us to go farther than we
have done now, and to take from them some material guarantee for the main-
tenance of quiet on the frontier”.75 The representatives of the Deb Raja
could propose to the Tibetans also the possibility of a direct meeting
between Paul and a Tibetan delegation: “[t]hey should clearly understand
that we regard their mediation as wholly in the interests of Tibet, from whom
the first advance should come”.76 Lord Dufferin also asked Sir Steuart
Colvin Bayley about the possibility of sending a message without the
Bhutanese mediation.77
After the May defeat, the need of involving Bhutanese reinforces
wasmore urgent for the Tibetans, while the British required amore de-
cisive and clearer stance of the Manchu Empire, just to weaken the Ti-
betan influence on Sikkim and Bhutan.78 Already in the attack of May
72 Ibidem.
73 “Viceroy will not refuse to give Paul authority which Lieutenant-Governor recommends.
But he should reserve entire freedom of action and not permit himself to be hampered by the
presence of the Bhutanese delegates. His position should be that we have very little to gain
by entering by any negotiations with the Tibetans.” Ibidem, Foreign Department, Simla
to Chief Secretary, Bengal, Calcutta (Telegram), 15th April 1888, No. 128, Enclosure
No. 9, f. 125, p. 14.
74 Ibidem, f. 126, p. 15.
75 Ibidem.
76 Ibidem.
77 “Viceroy wishes to know whether under circumstances Lieutenant-Governor thinks we might
preferably send message direct, and avoid any inconveniences consequent on Bhutanese me-
diation.” Ibidem.
78 “One thing is certain, – the people of Sikkim and the Tibetan lower classes are firmly
convinced thatChina is not friendly disposed to the English, butwill help the Tibetans.
If China can be induced to make some overt declaration in our favour, it will, in my humble
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some Bhutanese were lined up in the ranks of the Tibetans.79 These
200 Bhutanese men, however, came with the old enemy of Ugyen
Wangchuck, the Thimphu Dzongpon,80 Alu Dorji,81 who had taken
refuge in Tibet after the defeat at the battle of Changlimithang.82 Paul
himself saw some Bhutanese during the battle: “I myself noticed some
Bhutanese in the fight and one of the prisoners corroborates this.”83 Accord-
ing to further information that reached Paul, after the second defeat,
other Bhutanese were also going to join the Tibetans, in particular two
officials subjected to Paro Penlop and the Dzongpon of Haa,84 inWest-
ern Bhutan.85 At the beginning of July the Thimphu Dzongpon was
near Rinchengong86 – one of the Tibetan villages near the Sikkimese
border and where a large part of Lhasa’s troops were stationed87 – to-
gether with “140 Bhutanese soldiers, armed in part, so it is alleged, with
50 rifles, supplied by Kuzoo Lhase from the Sikkim Durbar”.88
The position of UgyenWangchuck, the real ruler of the country, was
very different: “Chuchipa – the Tongso Penlow – had recently offered the
Tibetans to come and mediate, but the latter had rejected his offer, saying
opinion, considerably clear our present difficult position of inactivity by confirming the loy-
alty of Sikkim and Bhutan people towards us.” Ibidem, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 9th
July 1888, f. 132, p. 2.
79 Ibidem, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 25th May 1888, attached to J. Ware Edgar to H.M.
Durand, 29th May 1888, No. 128, Enclosure No. 3, f. 123, p. 9.
80 Ibidem, f. 123, p. 10. According to Ugyen Kazi, the Bhutanese with the Thim-
phu Dzongpon were just 50 men (ibidem). Ugyen Kazi (Ugyen Dorji), later impor-
tant figure in Bhutanese political and diplomatic history, had recently returned to
Kalimpong. T. TASHI, Gongzim Ugyen Dorji: The King’s Aide and Diplomat Par Excel-
lence, edited by D. Chophel, Thimphu 2013, p. 10.
81 A lu rdo rje.
82 WHITE, p. 133.
83 TNA, FO 17/1108, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 25th May 1888, attached to J. Ware
Edgar to H.M. Durand, 29th May 1888, No. 128, Enclosure No. 3, f. 123, p. 10.
84 Ha¯.
85 “Already, besides the Timpoo Jongpen, who has all along sided openly with the Tibetans, I
hear the Zimpen and Nichen of Paro (two officers under the Penlow), as well as the Jongpen
of Har-tamphiong, are collecting and arming men to help the enemy.” TNA, FO 17/1108,
A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 9th July 1888, f. 132, p. 2.
86 Rin chen sgang; in the document “at Dudhyakham within half a mile of Rinchagong”,
ibidem, f. 133, p. 3.
87 BL, IOR/L/MIL/17/12/60, Report on the Sikhim Expedition, p. 44.
88 TNA, FO 17/1108, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 9th July 1888, p. 133. In Au-
gust, the Bhutanese under the command of the Thimphu Dzongpon were 300. BL,
IOR/L/MIL/17/12/60, Report on the Sikhim Expedition, p. 44.
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they were strong enough to retake Lingtu: if they failed, they would let him
know.”89 In addition to the Deb Raja and the Trongsa Penlop, the Paro
Penlop also offered Paul his own mediation.90 After the battle in May,
the three Bhutanese leaders sent the Dzongpon of Wangdi Phodrang
and another envoy – a signer of the Sinchula Treaty and personal
friend of Paul – to Phari, to meet the Tibetans.91 Later, they would
have met Paul in Gnatong.92 Paul recognized the good faith and hopes
of Ugyen Wangchuck and of his allies: “I believe, from motives of self-
interest, the ruling Chiefs of Bhutan are really anxious for peace, as they are in
an awkward position. Without positive assurances of aid from ourselves, they
are not strong enough to break with Tibet; while if they offend us, they fear
a stoppage of their subsidy, if not further loss of territory. Whether they will
be able to do anything is a different matter, which time alone will show.”93 In
this regard, it is useful to underline that the British subsidy to Bhutan
was the official motivation for Ugyen Wangchuck to reject the Tibetan
requests to intervene in the conflict on the side of Lhasa: in fact, the
Tibetans had tried to involve Ugyen Wangchuck, sending him differ-
ent requests after the second defeat.94 However, the future monarch
made clear that he did not want to risk losing the annual payment
of 50,000 rupees from the British Government.95 The Sinchula treaty
of 1865 guaranteed, in Article IV, an annual payment by the British
to the Government of Bhutan in exchange for territorial transfers in
the south of the country.96 The same treaty, however, provided in the
89 TNA, FO 17/1108, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 25th May 1888, attached to J. Ware
Edgar to H.M. Durand, 29th May 1888, No. 128, Enclosure No. 3, f. 123, p. 10.
90 Ibidem, A.W. Paul to J. Ware Edgar, 9th July 1888, ff. 133–134, pp. 3–4.
91 Ibidem.
92 Ibidem.
93 Ibidem, f. 134, p. 3.
94 Ibidem. Extract from a demi-official letter from Major H. Boileau, 11th August 1888,
No. 152, Enclosure No. 1, f. 189.
95 “I have just heard as follows from Sunder at Buxa: He says – ‘The old Vakil’s son has just re-
turned from Bhutan: he tells me that his Deb Zimpen and Angdoforang Jungpen will shortly
return from Paro. The Tibetans have informed them that they need not come to negotiate for
peace. The Tibetans are collecting all their men and are determined to fight. They will attack
our troops from two or three direction. The Vakil’s son is unable to say more than this about
their plan of operations. He tells me that messengers are frequently being sent to Tongso Pen-
low for resistance. He is said to have informed the Tibetans that, if Bhutan gives any help, the
subsidy of Rs. 50,000 will be stopped.’” Ibidem.
96 “In consideration of the cession by the Bhootan Government of the territories specified in
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article V the possibility for the British Government “to suspend the pay-
ment of this compensation money either whole or in part in the event of mis-
conduct on the part of the Bhootan Government or its failure to check the
aggression of its subjects or to comply with the provisions of the Treaty”. An
important sum of money for Bhutan that Ugyen Wangchuck did not
intend to lose without a powerful counterpart, identified by the future
monarch in a territorial transfer as reported by [Donald?] Sunder97 to
Major Henry Boileau, Deputy Commissioner of Julpigoree: “I am told
that Tongso Penlow has asked for the whole of the strip of Tibetan country as
far as a place called Gyase.”98 Furthermore, “[t]he agent for the Deb Raja
and the Vakil’s son also say that the Tibetans will not attack till November
next as they are not yet ready”.99 This last news was particularly use-
ful for Alfred Wallis Paul.100 Boileau suggested in his letter that “the
military authorities should post a wing in support at Julpai, the mere fact of
doing so would instil fear into the minds of the Bhutanese; they have their
spies about seeing what is going on. The Deb Raja’s agents who have come
ostensibly about that strip of Jainti land hang on at Buxa, though they have
Article II. of this Treaty, and of the said Government having expressed its regret for past
misconduct, and having hereby engaged for the future to restrain all evil-disposed persons
from committing crimes within British territory or the territories of the Rajahs of Sikkim and
Cooch Behar and to give prompt and full redress for all such crimes which may be committed
in defiance of their commands, the British Government agree to make an annual allowance
to the Government of Bhootan of a sum not exceeding fifty thousand rupees (Rs. 50,000), to
be paid to officers not below the rank of Jungpen, who shall be deputed by the Government of
Bhootan to receive the same. And it is further hereby agreed that the payments shall be made
as specified below:– On the fulfillment by the Bhootan Government of the conditions of this
Treaty, twenty-five thousand rupees (Rs. 25,000). On the 10th January following the first
payment, thirty-five thousand rupees (Rs. 35,000). On the 10th January following, forty-five
thousand rupees (Rs. 45,000). On every succeeding 10th January, fifty thousand rupees (Rs.
50,000).” Article IV of the Treaty of Sinchula.
97 The text of the letter of Boileau indicates only a certain Sunder at Buxa Fort. “I have
just heard from Sunder at Buxa”, TNA, FO 17/1108, Extract from a demi-official letter
from Major H. Boileau, dated 11th August 1888, No. 152, Enclosure No. 1, f. 176. He
is probably Donald Sunder, a magistrate in Julpigoree (Jalpaiguri) according to The
India List: Civil and Military, London 1888, p. 70.
98 Ibidem, Extract from a demi-official letter from Major H. Boileau, 11th August 1888,
No. 152, Enclosure No. 1, f. 189. It is difficult to determine which place is referred to.
It is unlikely to be Gyantse (Rgyal rtse), one of the main cities of Tibet. In this case,
such a proposal by Ugyen Wangchuck should be read simply as a request aimed at
total disengagement.
99 Ibidem.
100 Ibidem.
211
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
West Bohemian Historical Review VIII j 2018 j 2
been told the matter can’t be settled till the cold weather. I have thought this
suspicious”.101
The Encounter between Paul and a Bhutanese Delegation
AlfredWallis Paul met a Bhutanese delegation only on 20th August.102
The Bhutanese had consigned to the Political Officer “three letters from
Dharma Raja, Deb Raja, and the Bhutan Council, respectively, dated 27th
June and 2nd July, informing that, out of friendship and in accordance with
our treaty, they had despatched Angdoforung [Wangdi Phodrang], Jong-
pen, Som Doozi, Deb Zimpen and Lama Tenzing as envoys to mediate”.103
In addition, two other letters, written directly by the three Bhutanese
delegates at the beginning of August, however informed the Politi-
cal Officer of their failure in the face of the Tibetan refusal to arrive
at a diplomatic solution and thus their departure without meeting
Paul.104 However, the delegation informed Paul about the state of the
Tibetan forces as well as pointing out the neutrality of the Bhutanese
nobles: “These Bhutanese state 10,000 Khamtaya troops arrived and 2,000
more Khamt troops are shortly expected – total already assembled at least
10,000. Tibetans have everything ready for an attack, but when did not hear.
Provisions not plentiful; no assist has been given by Bhutanese Chiefs.”105
Concluding Considerations
On the geopolitical level, the Tibetan defeat represented a shift in the
risks to the power of Ugyen Wangchuck, a weakening of the historical
hegemonic role of Tibet in the southeastern region of the Himalayas
and the consolidation of the British influence on the area. In 1890,
the British would sign an agreement with the Chinese authorities in
Calcutta that recognized the British role on Sikkim.106 The attempted
101 Ibidem.
102 Ibidem, Telegram from Chief Secretary, Bengal, Dacca to Foreign Secretary, Simla,
21st August 1888, No. 152, Enclosure No. 5, f. 191. For accuracy, 20th August is the
date on which the meeting was communicated to Dhaka.
103 Ibidem, Telegram from Paul, repeated in a telegram from Chief Secretary, Bengal,
Dacca to Foreign Secretary, Simla, 21st August 1888, No. 152, Enclosure No. 5, f. 191.
104 “[T]wo other letters, dated 2nd August, written by envoy collectively, and also Angdoforung
separately, in which they regret refusal of Tibetans to listen to offers of mediation, has com-
pelled them to return without visiting me.” Ibidem.
105 Ibidem.
106 Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet. Signed at
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mediation of the Bhutanese, although failed due to the Tibetan clo-
sure, also represented a further rapprochement between Bhutan and
the British Raj. In 1909, John Claude White would write in this regard:
“soon after the Sikhim Expedition of 1888–9 broke the power and influence
of the Tibetans, and the cause of Aloo Dorji, who fought on their Side in the
attack on Gnatong inMay 1888 was lost. All subsequent attempts at interfer-
ence by the Chinese and Tibetans were frustrated by the closer relationships
with the Penlops which we maintained henceforth, and thus Ugyen Wang-
chuk’s influence in Bhutan was firmly established”.107
The factions of the battle of Changlimithang, re-proposing them-
selves in the Anglo-Tibetan conflict, with the defeated Thimphu
Dzongpon on the side of the Tibetans and Ugyen Wangchuck and its
main allies, the Paro Penlop and the Wangdi Phodrang Dzongpon, in
a cautious and balanced position, began to clarify the role that Bhutan
could play in Calcutta and London. Young Ugyen Wangchuck was
ferrying his country – a cultural, religious and linguistic landmark of
the Tibetan Buddhist world – towards a key-role in the geopolitical
landscape of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the
final decades of the Great Game, Ugyen Wangchuck would be able
to preserve the independence and identity of Bhutan, unify it under
his leadership and make it a political hinge between the Himalayan
universe and the Raj to the south. In addition to political and mili-
tary leadership, Ugyen Wangchuck also inaugurated his diplomatic
career. The Bhutanese attempt of 1888 can be read as a prelude to the
subsequent mediation work put in place by the Bhutanese under the
leadership of the future Druk Gyalpo, the most important of which re-
mains obviously carried forward directly by Trongsa Penlop himself
during the Younghusband Expedition of the 1904, three years before
his coronation in Punakha and the definitive birth of the monarchy.
Calcutta, March 17, 1890. With Regulations appended thereto, signed at Darjeeling, De-
cember 5, 1893, C. 7312, London 1894, pp. 1–3.
107WHITE, pp. 133–134.
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